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Abstract 
There has been a growing interest in research on performance measurement and 
management practices, which seems to reflect researchers’ response to calls for the 
need to increase the relevance of management accounting research. However, despite 
the development of the new public management literature, studies involving public 
sector organizations are relatively small compared to those involving business 
organizations and extremely limited when it comes to public primary health care 
organizations. Yet, the economic significance of public health care organizations in the 
economy of developed countries and the criticisms these organizations regularly face 
from the public suggests there is a need for research. This is particularly true in the case 
of research that may lead to improvement in performance measurement and 
management practices and ultimately to improvements in the way health care 
organizations use their limited resources in the provision of services to the 
communities. 
 
This study reports on a field study involving three public primary health care 
organisations. The evidence obtained from interviews and archival data suggests a 
performance management practices in these institutions lacked consistency and 
coherence, potentially leading to decreased performance. Hierarchical controls seemed 
to be very weak and accountability limited, leading to a lack of direction, low 
motivation and, in some circumstances to insufficient managerial abilities and skills. 
Also, the performance management systems revealed a number of weaknesses, which 
suggests that there are various opportunities for improvement in performance in the 
studied organisations. 
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1. Introduction 
Many researchers have argued that management accounting has lost its relevance (e.g. 
Johnson & Kaplan, 1987; Otley, 2001). Otley, for instance, maintains that “much 
management accounting research has lost its way” (2001, p. 243). He argues that 
management accounting is characterised by an excessive focus on accounting and little 
focus on management and that to recoup its relevance it needs to expand boundaries 
and increase focus on the issues surrounding the design and operation of systems used 
for performance management. This suggests the need for research that aims at 
exploring how performance is controlled and managed. 
 
Public sector organizations have received relatively smaller attention from researchers 
than business organisations. This is particularly clear in the health sector, where private 
health care organizations are typically the focus of existing studies. But even public 
health sector organizations have been considered (e.g. Abernethy & Stoelwinder, 1991; 
Chen, Radford, Wang, Marciniak & Krumholz, 1999; Eldenburg, Hermalin, Weisbach 
& Wosinska, 2004; Freer & Jackson, 1998; Hill, 2000; Jacobs, Marcon & Witt, 2004; 
Jones & Dewing, 1997; Llewellyn & Northcott, 2005; Mannion, Davies & Marshall, 
2005; Meyer & Collier, 2001; Pettersen, 2004; Scott, Mckinnon & Harrison, 2003; 
Stewart, 2003; Watkins, 2000), only a very few have investigated primary health care 
organizations (e.g. Gené-Badia, Jodar-Solà, Peguero-Rodrìguez, Contel-Segura & 
Moliner-Molins, 2001; Jackson & Bircher, 2002; e.g. Leese, Storey, Ford & Cheater, 
2005; McAlearney, 2002). Consequently, there seems to exist a clear scope for a study 
that aims at exploring performance measurement and management practices in primary 
health care organizations. 
 
This study is designed primarily to characterize management control systems (MCS) of 
Portuguese Health Centres and examine how these systems are used by the studied 
organizations. These Health Centres are dependant financially and administratively 
from other organisations and this makes their study more intricate and complex. This 
has led us to examine the MCS by using Otley’s (1999) and Merchant’s (1998) 
frameworks so to obtain a more comprehensive insight into the evidence. In developing 
the study, the following research questions were developed and researched: 
• What are the existing performance measurement and management control 
systems in the Health Centres? 
• Are the systems used by Health Centres consistent with the theory and what 
opportunities for improvement exist? 
• Are the performance measurement and management control systems consistent 
with the expectations of the main stakeholders (patients, employees, 
government)? 
 
In light of the nature of the research questions, the study has adopted a field study 
methodology. Many prominent researchers have made calls for the use of this research 
method (e.g. Kaplan, 1984; Otley, 2003; e.g. Scapens, 1990), which has become now 
widely accepted among researchers. Case studies provide empirical richness that can be 
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translated into theoretical developments (Hopper, Otley & Scapens, 2001; Otley & 
Berry, 1998) and make important contributions in academic research (Lee & 
Humphrey, 2006). Lee and Humphrey (2006) provide an example of the application of 
the case study method in the public sector accounting area, by examining the role and 
impact of accounting in public institutions. 
 
It is believed that this study contributes to the literature in the following ways. First, it 
adds to the limited number of studies that draw on Otley (1999) and Merchant (1998) 
frameworks. Although Otley’s framework has been widely cited, it has not been used to 
its fullest by researchers, perhaps with a small number of exceptions (e.g. Ferreira & 
Otley, 2005; e.g. Stringer, 2004). Second, with the exception of the study by Alves 
(1994) which investigated performance evaluation processes in Portuguese hospitals, 
very little research in the area of MCS has been conducted in the country. However, the 
public health care sector is frequently criticised publicly for its poor performance and 
poor performance management practices (budget overruns have been the norm over the 
years). This suggests that there is scope for improvement in the sector. Finally, it adds 
to the limited body of research using case study methodology. Stringer (2004) points 
out that lack of field studies in performance management can be the result of 
complexity of the issue, pressure for publications, access issues, and lack of resources. 
However, Stringer notes that this methodology is essential to further our understanding 
of relationships, connections, and links between different aspects of MCS.  
 
The paper is organized as follows. Section two provides a brief literature review, which 
includes the contributions from the new public management literature and of the two 
frameworks used in this study (i.e., Otley, 1999; Merchant, 1998). Section three 
describes the research method used in this study, leading to the empirical study 
description and discussion in the section four. Section five provides the concluding 
remarks of the study.  
2. Brief Literature Review 
In the late 1980s, the concept of ‘New Public Management’ (NPM) emerged in the UK 
and other Anglo-American countries. At its roots were the changes in the UK public 
sector (Cairney, 2002), changes that found their way into the academic literature under 
the umbrella of concepts and ideas of NPM (Aucoin, 1990; Hood, 1991).  
 
Although there are several doctrines associated with NPM (Hood, 1991; , 1995), they 
share the fundamental idea of eliminating the differences between private and public 
sector and advocate a change in emphasis from processes to results (Hood, 1995). Hood 
(1991; 1995) argues that NPM is operationalised by reducing the size of public sector 
organizations into smaller units, by creating a more competitive environment within the 
public sector, by giving preference to private-sector styles of management, and by 
promoting the efficient use of resources. These four of these aspects contribute towards 
bringing public and private sectors closer of each other and appeal for a sense of 
accountability in management in the public sector. Hood (ibid) further argues that the 
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operationalisation of NPM is attained by fostering professionalism of top-management 
of public sector organisations, by choosing clear and measurable performance 
standards, and by emphasising output controls. These aspects link extensively with the 
ideas of NPM since the administrative and professional discretion should be surrounded 
by explicit patterns and rules. Examples of the application of NPM principles in the 
public health sector are provided by previous researcher (Cairney, 2002; Harrison & 
Smith, 2003; Holloway, Francis & Hinton, 1999; Jacobs et al., 2004; Jones & Dewing, 
1997). 
 
Humphrey et al. (1993) dwell into the ideas of NPM by describing the changes in UK’s 
public sector since the introduction of Neo-liberalism in the late 1970s early 1980s. 
They report an increased interest in managerial accountability within public sector 
organizations, since the fundamental changes were introduced to public sector 
management leading to more efficient controls, introduction of performance indicators, 
improved resource management procedures, and the establishment of cash limits 
(Humphrey et al., 1993). 
 
NPM has been regarded as universal (Hood, 1991) for two main reasons. First, because 
it was portable and transferable since it was possible to apply the concept in different 
countries - from New Zealand and Spain (Newberry & Pallot, 2004; Torres & Pina, 
2004) to less developed countries (Uddin & Tsamenyi, 2005) - in different industries - 
from police (Hoque, Arends & Alexander, 2004) to healthcare (Cairney, 2002; 
Harrison & Smith, 2003; Pettersen, 2004) – and at different levels - from central 
government (Newberry & Pallot, 2004) to local government (Bogt, 2003; Budding, 
2004; Rouse & Putterill, 2005). Second, because it was considered to be non-political 
since it was used by Right Wing (Boden, Cox & Nedeva, 2006) and by Labour 
governments (Harrison & Smith, 2003). This is consequence of the fact that the NPM 
framework was proposed as a mechanism to achieve a higher level of efficiency and 
effectiveness in the public sector and this is a common objective for political parties 
from right to left wing. If we accept that efficiency and effectiveness can be achieved 
through innovation in management accounting procedures, this means that achievement 
will largely depend on the governments decisions (Jackson & Lapsley, 2003; Lapsley 
& Wright, 2004).  
 
There are reported examples of the application of NPM principles in the public health 
sector (e.g. Cairney, 2002; Harrison & Smith, 2003; e.g. Holloway et al., 1999; Jacobs 
et al., 2004; Jones & Dewing, 1997). One of the most important and visible changes in 
NPM is in the area of accounting. Jones and Dewing’s (1997) study examines the 
attitudes of clinical staff towards changes in accounting in the British public health 
sector. They conclude that changes in accounting were not relevant for medical staff, 
but were very important for management professionals for control purposes. In the 
same vein, Pettersen (2004) argues for the evaluation of interpretation and utilization of 
accounting information by top medical staff. This recommendation derived from his 
study of the reforms in Nordic countries (Pettersen, 2004).  
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Jacobs et al. (2004) found that although there was some curiosity in cost and activity 
information, medical staff usually did not access it because this information was mainly 
available at the most senior levels. These findings emerged from the analysis, 
conducted in four European countries, of the consequences of health reforms in terms 
of cost and performance information on doctors (Jacobs et al., 2004). In the UK, 
doctors had experienced problems with the changes. Doctors became more engaged in 
management and decision-making functions, but the increase of centralization of the 
purchasing function on health authorities reduced their role (Cairney, 2002).  
 
These changes in the public sector have led to a greater concern about efficiency, 
effectiveness and performance. Holloway et al. (1999) argue for more complex 
approaches to performance improvement, such as benchmarking, in public health 
sector. They conclude that even with the best management skills and organizational 
culture, public managers face important challenges. Aidemark and Lindkvist (2004) 
report on the transformation of two Swedish public hospitals into limited companies. 
This change had deep effects, with the hospital management becoming more 
commercially oriented, increases in productivity, and faster decision-making 
procedures that connected management and hospital physicians in the same vision and 
sense of purpose (Aidemark & Lindkvist, 2004). The level of government involvement 
in pricing and reporting in the health care sector has been found to be different across 
Nordic countries (Pettersen, 2004). 
 
Otley’s (1999) Framework 
Otley (1999) proposes a framework to analyse the operation of MCS. The framework 
draws on Otley’s many years of research experience, including his substantial 
contribution to the contingency theory of management accounting (which is based upon 
the idea that there is no single MCS that can be universally applied to organisations and 
circumstances (Otley, 1980)). Otley (1999) maintains that an understanding of the 
structure of performance management within organisations requires the consideration 
of five key areas:  key objectives, strategies and plans, target setting, rewards systems, 
and information flows.  
 
Few researcher studies have made drawn extensively on this framework, although 
many have cited it. Exceptions include Ferreira and Otley (2005), who use the in a field 
study and propose an extended framework for analysis of performance management, 
and Stringer (2004), who used the framework to review published field studies. Other 
research studies (Moon & Fitzgerald, 1996) draw on Otley’s (1987) version of Otley 
(1999) framework. 
 
Researchers have identified several strengths in Otley’s (1999) framework. Stringer 
(2004), in her review of the management accounting articles published in Management 
Accounting Research, and Accounting, Organizations and Society, found the 
framework general and helpful in her analysis. In similar vein, Ferreira and Otley 
(2005) maintain that the framework provides a useful structure to the analysis of 
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organizational control systems. The framework was regarded as robust in capturing 
various aspects of control systems in organisations and may provide support to other 
approaches such as culture (Stringer, 2004). Also, as the framework is generic, it is 
possible to complement it with other MCS frameworks, as shown by Ferreira and 
Otley’s (2005) study where it was combined with Simon’s (1995) levers of control. 
Another strength of the framework is that it is possible to use it directly without much 
difficulty and the questions presented are significant to organizations (Ferreira & Otley, 
2005). A final strength suggested by Ferreira and Otley is that the framework facilitates 
the collection of data, especially when large amounts of information is handled. 
 
But there are also limitations that have been associated with Otley’s (1999) framework. 
First, the framework does not make a reference to the organization’s vision and mission 
(Ferreira & Otley, 2005). As these issues must be taken into account in a management 
control process, it is only by the item ‘objectives’ that Otley’s (1999) framework can 
cover these areas (Ferreira & Otley, 2005). To overcome this limitation, in their 
extended framework, Ferreira and Otley (2005) give these aspects explicit recognition 
as part of the MCS. Second, Ferreira and Otley (ibid) found that the framework is more 
focused on diagnostic controls, as described by Simons (1995), and as such it oversees 
the more subtle and less conventional uses of MCS such as interactive MCS use. 
 
Third, the utilization of Otley’s (1999) framework provides information regarding the 
existence of MCS but not specifically how they are used (Ferreira & Otley, 2005). This 
distinction between existence and use of MCS is highlighted by Langfield-Smith 
(1997). Finally, Ferreira and Otley (2005) argue that the framework take a static stance 
and as such it is oblivious to change and its dynamics.  
 
In this study, Otley’s (1999) framework was complemented with Merchant’s (1998) 
framework, to which we now turn. 
 
Merchant’s (1998) framework 
Merchant (1998) maintains that there are three main reasons that justify why 
individuals may fail to act in organization’s best interest. These are lack of direction, 
lack of motivation, and lack of abilities. First, lack of direction happens when 
individuals do not understand what is expected of them, leading them to perform 
poorly. It is for management accountants to design MCS that assist in overcoming this 
issue so to increase employees’ contributions towards organizations’ objectives (1998). 
Second, lack of motivation emerges when individuals who are aware of what is 
expected of them are not interested in behaving appropriately because of motivational 
problems. This can happen when organizational objectives conflict with those of 
individuals. At least sometimes, employees will act in their own interest, rather than in 
the organization’s best interest (Merchant & Van der Stede, 2003). Thirdly, the lack of 
innate abilities or acquired abilities is another source of control problems, because they 
occur even when individuals know what is expected from them and are extremely well 
motivated. These problems are rooted in the lack of intelligence, training, experience, 
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or competencies for the work, but also on poor job design that leads inadequate 
decision-making and accidents (Merchant & Van der Stede, 2003). 
 
To prevent organisations from the suffering the effects of the control problems – i.e. 
lack of direction, lack of motivation, and lack of abilities - management uses control 
systems (Merchant, 1998). The vast array of controls types available can be classified 
into three main categories according to the object of control, that is, whether control is 
exercised over results, actions or personnel (Merchant & Van der Stede, 2003). Ouchi 
(1980; 1979) used a similar classification of control types, describing them as output, 
behavioural and clan and social. 
 
Results controls 
Control can be often be effected by focusing on results. Results are presented in only 
one basic form, that of results accountability. To put into practice results control, 
managers have to identify the dimensions along which results are desired and define 
standards of performance, measure performance on these dimensions and compare it 
with the pre-defined standards, and provide rewards for the desired results on order to 
promote the behaviours that lead to those results (Merchant & Van der Stede, 2003). 
 
One of the most important forms of results controls is the budgetary systems, which not 
only measure outputs but inputs as well. The promise of future rewards (or penalties), 
another form of result control, can be used as extrinsic motivation to induce individuals 
to behave suitably. However, the effectiveness of result controls is dependant upon 
individuals knowing what results are being sought, the existence of individual’s ability 
to influence the results for which they are being held accountable and the ability to 
measure the results effectively (Merchant & Van der Stede, 2003). 
 
Action Controls 
Action controls are designed to lead individuals act in a certain ways (Merchant & Van 
der Stede, 2003). Examples of action controls include behavioural constraints, which 
are implemented to impede undesirable behaviours, pre-action reviews from superiors 
to subordinates, action-accountability controls, and the costly option of redundancy. 
The implementation of action-accountability controls requires managers to define the 
limits of satisfactory behaviours (such as work rules, policies and procedures), follow 
the behaviours of employees, and penalise deviations from the defined limits (Merchant 
& Van der Stede, 2003). 
 
Personnel controls 
The use of personnel controls can result into two basic forces (Emmanuel, Otley & 
Merchant, 1990). Self-control, a naturally present force that drives most individuals to 
do a good job most of the time and social control, the pressure placed by workgroups 
on those who show dissent from a group’s norms and values. By upgrading the 
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capabilities of personnel in key positions through improved selection and placement 
policies, managers can encourage these basic forces. They can also introduce training 
programmes and improve communications to improve individuals’ understanding of 
their roles. Cohesive workgroups, with shared goals, typically induce peer control, 
which increase the probability of individuals behaving in a way that is coherent with 
the organization’s goals. In their study of the role of accounting and non-accounting 
controls in R&D divisions of two large industrial companies, Abernethy and Brownell 
(1997) show that personnel controls have an important role in organization 
effectiveness. 
 
3. The Research Method 
The case study method was used in this field study. Yin defines a case study as “an 
empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life 
context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not 
clearly evident” (1994, p.13). The use of this research method in the management 
accounting literature has become a widespread accepted method. This follows a 
number of calls for the use of case study research in the field of MCS (Kaplan, 1984; 
Otley, 2003; Scapens, 1990). 
 
Yin (1993) classifies case studies into exploratory, descriptive, or exploratory and each 
one of these can either be based on a single or on multiple case studies. Exploratory 
case studies aim at constructing questions and hypotheses for subsequent studies, while 
descriptive case studies show a full description of an experience within its context and 
explanatory case studies identify the causes produces the observed effects (Yin, 1993). 
An alternative classification has been proposed by Otley and Berry (1998): exploratory, 
critical, illustrative and accidental. They consider exploratory case studies those that go 
beyond the mere description of an issue and which adopt an inductive or deductive 
mode.1 Critical case studies aim at demonstrating that the theory is wrong by offering 
data that contradicts the theory, while illustrative case studies are used to clarify the 
existing theories via empirical observations (Otley & Berry, 1998). Finally, accidental 
case studies are not planned, although they may produce important contributions to the 
literature (ibid). 
 
This study offers a multiple-case exploratory (Yin, 1993) in that no particular 
hypotheses will be tested, but rather it represents a first approach to analyze the 
evidence and to generate issues for future research. The case studies fulfill also a 
descriptive role (Yin, 1993), particularly when they draw on Otley’s (1999) and 
Merchant’s (1998) frameworks to amass and describe the evidence collected. The 
choice for this type of research strategy took into account the three conditions identified 
by Yin (1993), that is the type of research question, the researcher’s control over 
behavioural events, and the center of attention (present or past events). (The type of 
                                                           
1
 The inductive mode happens when generalizations are made from observations, while the deductive 
mode occurs when some hypothesis are inferred from the theory and tested using observations. 
 - 8 - 
questions were “what”, ‘how’ and ‘why’, no need for control over behavioural events 
and the study focused on contemporary events.)  
 
Access and Data Collection Process 
During 2004 and 2005, meetings were held with key staff from the Health Sub-Region 
(HSR) of Porto. These meetings aimed at clarifying the developments in the HSR and 
in Health Centres (HCs) in terms of management control. Following these meetings, 
three HCs were selected for conducting the study, having taken into consideration their 
location and size. Location was a key factor because of the usual difficulties of HCs 
located in rural areas in attracting and retaining staff. 
 
The case study drew on semi-structured interviews with key informants in HCs and 
HSR and on archival and other data collected regarding these organizations. Two 
different sets of questions were developed for the semi-structured interviews, 
considering that two frameworks were used in the study. These questions were used in 
the interviews with HC’s directors, doctors, chief nurses, and chief of administrative 
staff. A simplified set of questions was employed when interviewing patients. All 
interviews were concluded in May 2005, and all of them were tape-recorded and fully 
transcribed. In total, that is considering the three case studies, three HC’s directors, 
three doctors, three chief nurses, three chiefs of administrative staff and 15 patients 
were interviewed. Additional evidence used to complement the evidence collected 
directly from HCs was obtained from HSR staff. This included interview material and 
archival data that was also useful for the triangulation process (Modell, 2005; Yin, 
1993). Five staff members from HSR, including the HSR Coordinator, were 
interviewed at various points of time during the development of the research project 
(see Appendix A for a detailed list of interviews).  
 
4. Empirical Study 
4.1. The background 
The reorganization of the Health Ministry Office conducted in 1971 has paved the way 
for the creation of the first Health Centres in Portugal.2 Four years later the health care 
district administrations emerged and in 1979 the Serviço Nacional de Saúde (National 
Health Service (NHS)) was created as a public-integrated model. Health care was 
organised and operated as any other government department in that health professionals 
are considered as public sector employees, although doctors working for the NHS were 
also allowed to have private practice. This system has been in place ever since. 
 
                                                           
2
 Governo Português. (1971). Decreto-Lei 413/71, de 27 de Setembro. 
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The NHS was decentralized in 1993 and organised in five health regions: North, 
Center, Lisbon and Tagus Valey, Alentejo, and Algarve.3,4 Each region is administrated 
and managed by an autonomous RHA (Regional Health Administration), which is 
accountable for monitoring the health status of the population, supervising the 
providers of NHS, and allocating financial resources to providers in the health region 
under their management. Despite the regional management and the general 
improvement of health status levels all over the country during the 1990’s, there is a 
clear and direct relationship between population health status and the coastal location 
and urbanization of municipalities (Santana, Vaz & Fachada, undated). That can be one 
of the reasons that Portuguese Government has declared, in October 1999, that health 
care as its main priority and two years later created the Portuguese Observatory on 
Health Care System (OPSS - Observatório Português para os Sistemas de Saúde) 
(Sakellarides, 2000). 
 
In addition to the Portuguese NHS, there are health insurance sub-systems that are 
financed through social contributions that cover about 25 percent of the population 
(mainly civil servants and employees from private financial organizations). Health care 
can be provided either by the insurance company or through their contractors (private 
and/or public health care providers). This population can also use NHS services, 
leading to one quarter of the population benefiting from double or even triple coverage 
through sub-systems in what can be regarded as a potential misuse of scarce resources 
(Guichard, 2004). Recently, the 17th Constitutional Government has changed most of 
these sub-systems in order to merge all of them into one (Governo Português, 2005a; 
2005b; 2005c). 
 
Primary Health Care in Portugal 
Primary Health Care plays a key role in the health care system since it is usually the 
first contact point with the population. Following from a reflexion on health financing 
in Portugal conducted in 1997, it was decided that HC should act as a gatekeeper of the 
hospital network (Associação Portuguesa da Economia da Saúde, 1997). Individuals 
can choose a GP (general practitioner or ‘family doctor’) from a primary health centre 
within their residential area with whom they have to register. It is this GP that will 
refer, when needed, patient to public hospitals or private specialists approved by the 
NHS.  
 
Guichard (2004) points out four main problems of the Portuguese HC. First, global 
resource allocation within the health care system is not favourable to primary care, 
because hospitals claim the bulk of the resources causing scarcity at the HC level. 
Second, the allocation of the scarce resources is sub-optimal, since HC do not have 
financial and managerial autonomy, which combined with bureaucratic rules, has led to 
inefficient patterns of service. The lack of efficiency among HC is supported by the 
evidence provided by Mourato (2004), which led him to conclude that almost 70 
                                                           
3
 Governo Português. (1979). Lei 56/79, de 15 de Setembro. This Decree Law established the Rules of 
Portuguese NHS. 
4
 These regions are subdivided into a total of 18 districts. 
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percent of Alentejo’s HC were not efficient. Third, primary care supply is currently 
insufficient, since about ten percent of the population is waiting to register with a GP. 
Finally; the HC gatekeeping system has the undesirable effects of encouraging 
continuity and allowing primary care doctors to filter and co-ordinate care. This may 
reduce patient’s satisfaction and lead to duplication of visits. 
 
The Minister of Health acknowledged in 2004 the continued shortfall of GPs and the 
shortcomings in HC organisation (Direcção-Geral da Saúde, 2004a; 2004b; 2004c). 
Interventions were regarded as a need, including HC reorganisation through 
implementation of new information systems, decentralisation, training, and greater 
flexibility in setting remuneration packages for health professionals through 
introduction of new payment mechanisms such as capitation (Ministério da Saúde de 
Portugal, 2003).5 However, changing remuneration systems does not appear to be 
sufficient. Pereira (1998) concluded from his survey study that the functions performed 
by the family doctors and the organization of HC are factors that contribute to doctors’ 
professional dissatisfaction. In a study conducted in 2001, it was found that health 
services managers were more aware about performance management at an institutional 
level than at an individual level (Conceição, Gonçalves, Blaise, Lerberghe & Ferrinho, 
2001). This highlights the issue of lack or performance evaluation and management at 
an individual level. 
 
4.2. Primary Health Care Centre 1 (HC1) 
Background 
HC1 was located 60 kms away from the city of Porto in a rural area. The Centre served 
a population of 52,930 inhabitants, but the number of registered patients was about 
54,300 (this represents a cover rate of about 102,6%, a little below the district average 
cover rate of 106,8%) (ARS Norte - SRS Porto, 2004; , 2005). HC1 had 20 family 
doctors, 27 nurses and 23 administrative staff professionals and was supported by some 
primary care equipment. 
 
During 2004, HC1’s output included more than 33,000 initial appointments, whilst the 
total number of appointments during the same year was approximately 125,000. Thus, 
the average number of appointments per patient per year was 3.78, which compares 
with district average of 4.0. The rate of active patients of the HC1, that is, the percent 
of registered patients that in fact use the centre, was in the same year of 61%, a little 
below the district average of 65.9% (ARS Norte - SRS Porto, 2004; , 2005). 
 
                                                           
5
 In 1998, a voluntary Experimental Remuneration Model for GPs, involving 500 doctors, was launched. 
This model included adjusted “capitation” income and a bonus system based on the completion of 
specific health care targets. This pilot-experience showed positive results. 
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Otley’s (1999) framework  
Objectives 
Three key objectives were apparent at HC1. Firstly, to improve the level of service by 
insuring that all patients had an assigned GP was indicated by HC1’s Director as the 
key priority of the Centre. At the time of the interview, there were 18,200 patients 
without an assigned GP, an issue that was regarded very negatively by patients. 
Secondly, to provide all pregnant women and children under the age of two a ‘family 
doctor’ was a second key priority, according to the HC1’s Director. This objective was 
been achieved at HC1, despite the low number of GPs in the Centre. This is consistent 
with the statement by an interviewed pregnant woman, who indicated not to have any 
complaints with regards to the service received at HC1. Thirdly, the other key 
objectives of HC1 were treatment and, more importantly, disease prevention, although 
the Director stated that due to shortage of GPs and nurses the Centre only provided the 
“essentially treatments.” 
 
The third key objective – treatment and disease prevention – was considered by the 
interviewed GP as the main objectives of HC1. Similarly, the definition of the main 
objectives of the HC by the interviewed nurse was health promotion and disease 
prevention. Another important objective, although not considered by the nurse as 
important as the previous one, was disease treatment. Nevertheless, the nurse conceded 
that treating patients was the most usual, leaving behind the other more important, but 
less urgent, objectives. This view was corroborated by the administrative officer 
interviewed, who asserted that the main objective of the HC was to treat patients, 
because there was no time available for prevention. The nurse also noted that new staff 
received the host manual upon their deployment to HC1 and that it explained, among 
other things, the Centre objectives, the way it operated and its rules and regulations.  
 
Strategies and Plans 
Broad strategies for HCs were defined centrally by HSR, leaving to local centres the 
development of operational strategies. HC1’s Director expressed the view that he 
wished to implement strategies in health promotion area, but that this was restrained by 
lack of human resources (i.e. GPs and nurses).  
 
HC1 did not seem to have any operational strategy or plan well-defined, which meant 
that the Centre was mostly managed on an ad hoc basis. This view was expressed by 
the chief administrative officer. This interviewee also noted that although every HC 
was required to produce its Activity Plan6 to deliver to HSR, there was plenty of 
‘flexibility’ with HCs that experienced structural problems, such as shortage of staff. 
Although the interviewed GP stated that there was a plan for health services, this was 
dismissed by the chief of administrative officer. This officer admitted that HSR had 
requested the Activity Plan several times, a plan that was usually produced by a person 
from the administrative area. So, in conclusion, there was very little of strategic 
                                                           
6
 Governo Português. (1993). Decreto-Lei 11/93, de 15 de Janeiro. 
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With little planning being made at local level, target setting was not common practice. 
Although HSR appeared to have set targets for some key performance measures, the 
HC1’s Director did not know what level of performance the Centre was required to 
achieve. Similar comments were received from the other interviewees. The chief 
administrative officer stated “there are no defined objectives, which is a problem for 
performance measurement; [this is something] that must come from high structures and 
yet nothing comes to us.” Although the Chief Nurse noted that her team worked 
towards the highest quality standards, the lack of quantified objectives is likely to 
negatively affect performance (Merchant & Van der Stede, 2003). 
 
Rewards 
HC1’s interviewees were unanimous in stating that there were neither rewards nor 
penalties associated to their performance. But as stated by the GP, it would be difficult 
to know who should be penalized or rewarded given that no-one knew what the pre-
defined level of performance of the Centre was. The Director illustrated the lack of 
reward and penalties with an anecdote: “I have a GP who does not turn up 140, 150 
times a year without giving explanation for it. As far as I know he did not have any 
penalties for it.” The Chief Nurse indicated that staff had to work in a self-motivation 
basis given the inexistence of a rewards system. However, even this self-motivation 
seemed to be at jeopardy because “nobody gives us the right value; on the contrary, it is 
all about orders, nothing about rewards”, the nurse maintained. This remark was 
consistent with the opinion of the chief of administrative officer who stated that “once I 
tried to save some money for the HC by changing our cleaning provider, I had several 
problems with the Director because the provider demanded an unfair compensation for 
the change.” In conclusion, there were neither performance evaluation mechanisms nor 
reward systems in place. Only intrinsic motivation and the satisfaction of performing 
and doing one’s duties appeared to be a motivator for staff. 
 
Information flows 
Information circulated in HC1 with some difficulty. The overall direction that the 
Centre was to take was defined centrally by HSR. Some guidelines for change and 
improvement to the Centre performance were received from HSR, stated the Director. 
Additionally, this interviewee noted that HC1 learned from experience and this learning 
was incorporated in new decisions.  
 
Internally, nurses were the only group of professionals that had regular meetings, 
usually after working hours, to discuss better ways of performing their roles, 
maintained the Director. The Chief Nurse confirmed the existence of these meetings 
and stated that nurses that missed the meeting were briefed with the relevant 
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information. This was not a common procedure among doctors who, according to the 
interviewed GP, “learned by themselves with no team work”. Furthermore, the 
interviewee considered the nurses’ meetings very positive in improving their 
performance and that a similar arrangement for doctors would be beneficial. Among 
administrative staff there was no formal way of promoting learning, but when possible, 
procedure corrections were transmitted to all administrative staff, stated the chief of 
administrative officer. Also, suggestions for improvement in procedures were 
encouraged in the administrative area. 
 
Discussion 
Objectives. A conflict between stated objectives and practice seemed to exist at HC1. 
The vast majority of interviewees recognized that the main objectives of a HC should 
be prevention and health promotion. However, in practice, other objectives were given 
priority. For example, the Director’s main concern was to solve the lack of GPs’ 
problem. The GP, the nurse and the chief of administrative officer interviewed 
maintained that treatment of patients was their first priority. 
 
Moreover, no concern about the way resources were managed was expressed by HC1 
staff. This can perhaps be explained by the fact that HCs were neither financially nor 
administratively autonomous. As such, most professionals were likely to regard 
resources issue as an external problem, because salaries and all main costs were born 
directly by HSR not by the HC. This can may suggest lack of accountability among 
professionals. 
 
Strategies and plans. The Director and the administrative staff of HC1 did not identify 
any strategy or produce plans for the centre. It appeared that key employees in the HC 
did not have enough guidance, an issue potentially problematic for the organisation. 
The reason offered by interviewees was that they were waiting for 
directions/instructions from HSR. As stated by a former HSR staff member currently 
working at a HC, HSR demanded a plan from all HC, although it was very ‘flexible’ 
with centres that faced staff shortages. Thus, HC1 did not run into problems for not 
having prepared the requested plan. 
 
On the other hand, the doctor and the nurse indicated to be aware of the activities’ plan 
they had to deliver. This suggests that there were neither strategies nor plans at the 
management level, but in medical area there were some form of plans that provided 
orientation to staff. The explanation for this ambivalence may rest on the fact that HSR 
had two directorates: administration services (which included the financial division) 
and health services. As each one provided information for HC in a relatively 
independent way, it was not unusual for medical services to receive guidelines from 
health services, whilst management did not. HC1’s Director, in spite of being a GP by 
training, was closer to administration services and, consequently, was not necessarily 
aware of what was happening in the medical area. 
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Targets. In terms of level of performance the institution had to achieve, the response 
was unanimous: No level of performance was defined and no targets were set. The 
consequence of this was that professionals’ performance resulted from their sense of 
duty and professional accountability. 
 
Rewards. Given that no targets were previously defined, it was not possible to have 
rewards or penalties. The inexistence of a reward system was not unique to HC1. This 
is common practice in all Portuguese public administration. There were severe 
restrictions in assessing public servants’ performance and labour unions were very 
active in maintaining the status quo. For several times, labour unions had publicly 
argued for the equal distribution of rewards or prizes, an approach that renders rewards 
system ineffective (due to free rider problems). 
 
Information flows. The majority of information circulated orally in the Centre. There 
was no procedures manual and no written documentation indicating information flows. 
GPs worked individually and this did not contribute to sharing important information. 
Communication between the Director and GPs seemed to be ineffective as they 
expressed opposite views on common issues. For example, while the GP stated that 
GPs were motivated, the Director maintained that there was lack of motivation among 
GPs. 
 
Merchant’s (1998) framework 
In this section we analyse the empirical evidence using Merchant’s (1998) framework. 
The aim is to examine whether HC1 has the control problems defined by Merchant 
(1998), i.e., lack of direction, lack of motivation, and lack of abilities. 
 
Provision of direction 
At the management level, each HC received its main orientations from HSR. There 
were some management tools used by HSR to monitor HC’s direction in two main 
areas: medical and administrative / financial. Medical area was controlled through the 
Activity Plan and tableau de bord, while the administrative / financial area relied on the 
tableau de bord, on the petty cash fund management, and on the budget of the HSR 
(which was divided by HCs) for control purposes. 
 
At the more operational level, within the Centre, there were other aspects to consider 
help understanding the Centre’s direction. First, the Director explained that the 
guidelines that came from HSR were the basis for the work among HC1’s staff. Those 
guidelines were copied and distributed for all Centre’s staff. However, the nurse 
admitted that, most of time, professionals did not perform according to strategic 
orientations from the higher structures of the Health Ministry due to time and other 
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resource constraints. As an example, one can point the practice of providing curative 
health care versus the strategic aim of prevention and health promotion. 
 
The GP and chief of administrative officer maintained they were aware of the Centre’s 
objectives, although there was no evidence of written them. On a different note, the 
chief administrative officer admitted that the procedures manual could be useful for 
control purposes, but that this had not been possible to produce up to that point of time. 
 
Thus, all considered, the existing management control systems at HC1 seems to be 
short of its role of providing direction to individuals working at the Centre. Where 
direction was provided, there appeared to exist a lack of coordination that created 
difficulties to the MCS in fulfilling its role. 
 
Provision of motivation 
There are two different types of motivation: intrinsic motivation and extrinsic 
motivation. Intrinsic motivation comes from the inside and it was reflected by the 
statements made by interviewees when they spoke about how satisfied they feel when 
doing their job. Extrinsic motivation is externally provided to individuals, such as 
monetary rewards.  
 
Interviewed professionals stated that they were very motivated. The Director was 
motivated because s/he wanted to change the difficult situation of lack of medical staff. 
The GP pointed self-achievement as the main reason for being motivated when s/he 
stated that “being a doctor is an important mission.” For the Chief Nurse it was the way 
his/her job had been designed the main cause of her high motivation. S/he stated “In the 
HC1 I do not have to work on weekends, nights, or holidays, like in hospitals.” The 
chief of administrative officer highlighted patients’ satisfaction as being very important 
and a key source of motivation. S/he wanted to transform HC1 into a role model for the 
others and disseminate his/her motivation to other colleagues.  
 
Partially in contrast with their self views, HC1’s Director noted that it was very 
difficult to motivate staff, especially GPs and nurses. The Director noted that some 
staff, especially GPs, was not available to work extra hours even when paid for it. 
Boredom due to repetitiveness of work and excessive emphasis on curative health were 
identified as two of the factors that negatively affected GPs’ motivation. This low 
motivation was the cause, according to the director, of the end of GPs meetings.  
 
The Chief Nurse stated that “some young nurses come to HC with many good ideas, 
but they cannot put these into practice because there is other monotonous work to do”. 
As such, motivation was much lower than it could possibly be. Among administrative 
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staff, short-term contracts and the request to complete tasks for which they were not 
prepared were causes of disappointment and low morale. 
 
All considered, the existing MCS did not seem to provide enough motivation to 
individuals as there were limited structures in place that contributed to this end.  
 
Provision of abilities 
HC1 appeared to have adequately trained medical staff. It is generally recognized in the 
country that doctors received high standard training in local universities. However, 
doctors require continuous training due to the development of medical sciences. This 
was achieved via attendance to medical congresses and conferences, the GP stated. 
Related to this issue of learning and training were the GP meetings, that provided a 
forum for sharing of knowledge and experiences. The GP admitted that these meetings 
were no longer held at HC1, although some information was informally shared among 
GPs. 
 
In contrast, nurses’ meetings were well-established and appeared to be a relatively 
successful forum for a sharing of experiences that contributed to improvements in 
nurses’ performance. Also, HC1’s nurses appeared to have adequate training. This was 
in sharp contrast with administrative staff, which appeared to be poorly prepared to 
perform certain activities (e.g. public assistance). This was supported by HC1’s 
Director’s recognition “there is a need for training, especially among administrative 
staff.” This deficiency at the level of abilities and skills is likely to be a reflection of the 
poor selection practices of the country’s public administration. 
 
The abilities and skill gap was also apparent at the level of the HC1 Director, who did 
not have any specific training in economics, management, accounting or finance. S/he 
stated “I am the responsible for the financial area [of the HC1] and I need to have a 
minimum of knowledge about it, but [what I know] is kind of auto-didactic.” The GP 
noted that the Director of the HC1 should be a professional manager, as with other 
HCs. 
 
Thus, there seemed to be some lack of abilities at the HC1 level, particularly among 
administrative staff and management. Although GPs did not have regular meetings, this 
did not appear to severely affect their skills. Nurses seemed to be one of the most well 
trained staff groups in the Centre. 
 
Discussion 
In terms of the link between HSR and HC1, there seemed to exist poor communication 
regarding performance between HSR and the Centre. However, this Centre was not 
used to produce the Activity Plan that should be presented annually to HSR due to lack 
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of enforcement. Hierarchical controls seemed to be very weak in the relationship 
between HSR and HC1. This seemed to have led to poor direction being given to HC1. 
Within HC1, professionals were aware of some objectives and different views into 
what the key objectives were expressed. The poor information flows severely affected 
goal alignment between HSR and HC1 and among different staff groups at HC1.  
 
The application of additional resources to the development of clear job design for staff 
might assist in reducing HC1’s motivational problems. Specific training could assist in 
improving staff qualifications, as well as improvements in staff recruitment and 
selection to ensure that skilled employees join the Centre (Merchant & Van der Stede, 
2003). The institutionalisation of meetings could provide an appropriate forum for 
communication of objectives and key priorities. Furthermore, a stronger leadership 
could be useful to create a different organizational culture that could be reinforced by 
the use of group rewards.  
 
4.3. Primary Health Care Centre 2 (HC2) 
Background 
HC2 was located in the city of Porto. The Centre served a population of 37,855 
inhabitants, but the number of patients registered was about 43,000 (this represents a 
cover rate of 113,5%). The Centre had 23 family doctors, 25 nurses and 17 
administrative staff professionals. There was some equipment available in this HC to 
provide primary care services. 
 
During 2004, HC2 had more about 22,400 initial appointments and a total number of 
appointments above 78,000. Hence the average number of appointments per patient per 
year in the Centre was 3.5, a figure that compares with the district average of 4.0. On 
the other hand, the rate of active patients was about 52% (the district average was of 
65.9%), which means that only half of registered patients used the HCs in 2004 (ARS 
Norte - SRS Porto, 2004; , 2005). 
 
Otley’s (1999) framework  
Objectives 
A number of key objectives were apparent at HC2. First, the interviewed Director 
explained that the provision of quality in health care services was the most important 
objective. “Although there is an insufficient number of staff, we are trying to provide 
patients a healthcare service with quality”, stated the Director. Second, other two key 
objectives of HC2 were health care (including prevention, health promotion, and 
treatment) and training, according to the interviewed GP. This interviewee explained 
that “both objectives [health care and training] are related, because if we cannot satisfy 
our internal client, the professional, we cannot satisfy our external client, the patient”. 
The GP noted that patients’ satisfaction depended directly from the professionals’ 
motivation and satisfaction. Third, another key objective of the Centre was to satisfy 
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the immediate needs of patients. Although the Chief Nurse acknowledged that health 
care in terms of promotion and prevention should be the main aim, the tendency was 
apply resources in patient’s treatment. Finally, HC2 aimed to provide accessibility to 
patients, for example, by enabling them to make appointments by phone. This new 
process faced some implementation difficulties in the Centre. The chief of 
administrative officer experienced hardship in persuading colleagues. S/he stated “I had 
to talk with my administrative colleagues to persuade them to improve the service on 
phone calls, but it was not easy.” 
 
Strategies and plans 
It was unclear what strategies were HC2 meant to follow, since no specific direction 
was received from HSR. It was only by following procedural controls that interviewees 
indicated to attempt to achieve HC2’s objectives. 
 
With regards to plans, two aspects stood out at HC2. First, the annual plan was 
mentioned by all interviewees as the main planning control mechanism. HC2’s Director 
acknowledged that most guidelines came from HSR, although s/he also stated that “it is 
our responsibility to identify the main areas to take action”. This view was shared by 
the GP, who was the former Centre’s Director. The chief of administrative officer 
pointed out that the Centre evaluated its success in meeting the Activity Plan without 
any involvement from HSR. The Activity Plan included specific objectives for different 
areas (e.g., nursery). 
 
Second, HC2 was one of the centres that volunteered to use the MoniQuOr system. The 
MoniQuOr system was used for measuring the Centre’s performance, explained the 
Director. The use of this system required the cooperation of individuals from all staff 
groups (i.e. doctors, nurses, and administrative staff).  
 
It is worth noting that although the MoniQuOr system did not take too long to 
implement and was simple to use, only a few of HCs had volunteered to participate in 
the project, stated the Director. The Director also stated that “in the past, the MoniQuOr 
had a higher adhesion by other HCs, but now, probably, there are other priorities. 
However, I think it is a good methodology to evaluate institutions’ performance.” 
 
Target setting 
It seemed that the level of performance HC2 had to achieve was defined internally, 
rather than being externally imposed by HSR. The Director explained the Centre 
received indicative targets from HSR, but that targets were ultimately defined internally 
for various areas, such as levels of service to vulnerable patients’ groups. Similar views 
were expressed by other interviewees, such as the nurse and the chief administrative 
officer. It was also noted by the nurse that it was sufficient to accomplish the pre-
defined norms and rules. The chief of administrative officer explained that although 
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HSR did not impose any performance targets for the Centre, “the objectives [i.e. 
targets] were defined accordingly with HSR indications, and evaluated within the 
Centre.” On a different note, the GP stated that the introduction of the Program-Budget, 




It was clear that no reward system existed at HC2. The Director explained “We have 
neither rewards nor penalties, but I think things should change. We must give 
incentives to institutions and to staff in order to have improvements.” The interviewed 
GP maintained that from a formal point of view there were “zero rewards”. It was also 
stated that some people within public administration made mockery of those that made 
efforts to improve by using expressions like “you will receive a cork medal!”, the GP 
stated. 
 
In different line of thinking, the Chief Nurse argued that self-achievement was the 
single reward that existed and that it was the result of fundamental teamwork. S/he 
stated “this year we achieved the vaccination target and we are very happy. This is [the 
result of] teamwork, because if the doctors did not send patients to vaccination and did 
not motivate them, they would not go.” The idea of personal self-satisfaction was 
shared by the chief of administrative officer, when he stated “if we look to our 
performance indicators, evaluate them, and confirm that they are improving, that gives 
us a special satisfaction.” 
 
In sum, similarly to HC1, there were no forms of extrinsic rewards in place at HC2. 
However, some staff indicated personal satisfaction as an effective form of reward for 
the performance achieved. The GP and Director’s views were in line with NPM ideas 




Five types of information flows were identified at HC2. First, Director noted the 
importance of informal discussions among staff and staff groups in disseminating 
information. Second, key orientations were established by Director for GPs, who were 
then accountable for outcomes and processes involved in achieving them. This 
involved the use of the appointment management system by the GPs that enabled them 
cover for each other when needed and consequently permitted to ensure that patients 
were looked after on the day and time of their appointment. The Director maintained 
that “in the last five years we have tried to give responsibility to all professionals; we 
want them to feel responsible for what happens in this institution.”  
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Third, closed circuit television (CCTV) displaying a video was used for communication 
with staff and patients by the Centre. The video included information regarding policies 
and administrative procedures. This media is not common in HCs. Fourth, the host 
manual was another tool used for providing information to staff and patients. “We 
found that the host manual and the information video were precious helps to avoid 
complaints from patients; each person acknowledged what is expected from them”, 
stated the Director. Finally, information also flowed in staff meetings. As indicated by 
the Director, these meetings were instrumental in the process of making the Centre’s 
objectives known to all staff. Also, the Chief Nurse explained that meetings were used 
to “define who does the teaching” as part of the “annual training plan.” Attending 
meetings was part of the regular activities of staff for GPs and administrative staff, 
although medical meetings had a fortnightly pattern, while the administrative staff 
meetings had no defined pattern but were used to “talk about improving procedures to 
optimize HC’s efficiency”, stated the administrative officer. 
 
All considered, HC2 seemed to be slightly different from HC1. Several and diverse 
information flows were apparent and these appeared to be driven by the goals of 
improving quality and organisation.  
 
Discussion 
Objectives. In HC2, as with HC1, there seemed to be a conflict between stated 
objectives and what actually happens on the field. This was reflected by the fact that all 
staff highlighted the importance of prevention and health promotion, while they 
acknowledged that health treatment was at the top of the priorities. However, there 
appeared to exist more cohesion behind stated objectives when compared with HC1. 
 
Training was regarded as an important objective of the Centre and it seemed to be 
related with the motivational issues discussed by Merchant’s (1998). The use of a KPI 
related to number of telephone bookings in the tableau de bord is likely to be the 
explanation for the emphasis given to this aspect by the chief administrative officer, in 
what can be regarded as a reductionist view of the roles of the Centre. 
 
Strategies and plans. The evidence suggests that there was little strategic thinking at 
HC2, particularly with regards to the overall strategic directions that the Centre was to 
follow. The HSR appeared to have failed in providing to the strategic orientation 
required by the individual units under its control. Nevertheless, operational strategies 
and objectives were developed locally and these provided the impetus for the main 
activities conducted by the Centre. 
 
In terms of plans, the use of the Annual Activity Plan and of the MoniQuOr were key 
parts in the process of implementing operating strategies and achieving the Centre’s 
objectives. The Annual Activity Plan was highlighted by all interviewees as the most 
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important tool for the evaluation of HC2’s performance, particularly because it 
followed HSR main orientations but was tailored to local circumstances. It was, 
however, surprising to hear interviewees indicating that no feedback was received from 
HSR with regards to how the Centre had performed according to its Activity Plan. This 
clearly reduced the scope of control and accountability at the institutional level. On the 
other hand, the use of the MoniQuOr was recognised by the Director as very important 
way of assessing and improving the Centre’s performance. 
 
Targets. Some targets were proposed by HSR, but it was up to each Centre to adapt 
them to local conditions. Therefore, there was considerable flexibility in target setting. 
The target setting process appeared to contribute to identifying key objectives but also 
increase staff participation and accountability. 
 
Rewards. No performance evaluations or reward systems existed in the Centre. This 
was expected, since this was a common practice in the Portuguese public 
administration. However, not only there was not a culture of merit and performance but 
also, those who excelled in their jobs were subject of mockery by others at times. This 
created an environment unfavourable for performance, where staff was driven mostly 
by their self-satisfaction. The Director and the GP advocated the urgent need of 
implementing a reward systems a change to a organisational culture based on merit. 
 
Information flows. In sharp contrast with our observations at HC1, a range of channels 
were used in this HC2 to assist the flow of information. These information flows 
assisted in creating a sense of direction, but then the Centre relied on empowered staff 
to carry out the tasks needed. It also contributed to a sense of togetherness behind the 
Centre’s objectives that would at times lead to a more flexibility approach in dealing 
with the patients. The use of video and CCTV for communicating to staff and patients 
was an innovative in the public administration. This was complemented with a number 
of meetings with all staff groups for sharing information, experiences, actions and 
plans. 
 
Merchant’s (1998) framework 
Provision of direction 
As with HC1, a number of management control tools have used to monitor HC2’s 
direction in two major areas: medical and administration / finance. Medical area was 
monitored through the Activity Plan and tableau de bord. The administrative / financial 
area was controlled through tableau de bord, Petty Cash Fund Management, and 
Budget of the HSR (which was divided by HCs). 
 
At the more operational level, there were other elements to consider that could help to 
know the Centre’s direction. For the Director there were no reasons for lack of 
direction. S/he stated “Meetings were made with all professionals to transmit the 
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mission and the objectives of the institution, which means that all professionals know 
what is expected from them”. This opinion was shared by the other interviewed 
professionals that stated the regular use of meetings as a mean of clarifying direction.  
 
GPs had regular meetings, in which they clarified eventual doubts about the orientation. 
Nurses were informed about what to do daily, as they worked in an open space that 
facilitated communication. Other doubts could be clarified during regular meetings 
among nurses. The interviewed nurse believed that “Before coming to a HC, people 
know what is expected from them”. Administrative staff had usual meetings in which 
the objectives and guidelines were transmitted. 
 
Thus, the existing structures of management control systems seemed to provide 
insufficient direction at the management level. At the operational level, it seems that 
HC2’s professionals are aware of the direction of the Centre. 
 
Provision of motivation 
All HC2’s interviewees maintained that they were very motivated in doing their work. 
This was due to intrinsic motivation and it was justified by the statements made by 
interviewees. For example, the interviewed GP stated “I do my work with all vigour. I 
am almost a possessive. I am in love, on the philosophical sense of the word”. 
 
The Director believed there was a growing feeling of motivation among all 
professionals of the Centre. However, there were some problems that limited 
motivation among professionals. First, there were some professionals with an advanced 
age that were resistant to change. Second, changing of structural health policies 
resulted from the changing of Governments. The long-term guidelines were put in 
question. Third, some nurses that were transferred from hospitals to HCs, as the result 
of hospitals’ privatization, were not totally motivated, as they have to change their way 
of working. As stated by the Chief Nurse, there were many differences between the role 
of hospitals’ nurses and the role of HCs’ nurses. 
 
In sum, the management control systems did not explicitly provide extrinsic motivation 
(rewards), but levels of internal motivation, at least, among interviewees, appeared to 
be generally at acceptable levels. 
 
Provision of abilities 
HC2’s professionals were well prepared to perform their roles, especially in medical 
area. The only problem of personal limitations among medical staff was with some 
nurses that came from hospitals. According to the Chief Nurse some nurses were not 
well prepared to work in a HC, because they worked differently in the hospital. The 
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nurse said “For working in a HC, professionals have to learn a lot of procedures, 
because there are many differences between HCs and hospitals”. 
 
As with HC1, some personal limitations of administrative staff were apparent in HC2. 
Public assistance was the function that most of administrative staff was less trained. 
The Director explained “In the public assistance we have some old professionals, who 
do not assimilate the necessary competencies”. The possible reason for this was the 
deficient process of selection and placement at public administration. In addition, some 
administrative staff was not available to learn, as they wanted to be retired soon. The 
chief of administrative staff believed that the SIADAP7 would change the situation, as 
this system evaluated the professional’s performance. 
 
Discussion 
As with HC1, the link between HSR and HC2 seemed to be weak in terms of 
communication regarding performance between HSR and the Centre. Although there 
was an Activity Plan produced annually by the Centre, there was no feedback from 
HSR. 
 
Specific training could be useful in improving staff qualifications, especially among 
administrative staff. Additionally, improvement in staff selection would be important to 
assure that skilled professionals join the Centre (Merchant & Van der Stede, 2003). 
 
4.4. Primary Health Care Centre 3 (HC3) 
Background 
HC3 was situated in a locality near the city of Porto. The Centre served a population of 
64,387 inhabitants, but the number of patients registered was about 61,950 (this 
represents a cover rate of about 96,2%) (ARS Norte - SRS Porto, 2004; , 2005). HC3 
had 35 family doctors, 38 nurses and 31 administrative staff professionals. There was 
some equipment available in this Centre to provide primary care services. 
 
During 2004, HC3’s output included more than 44,100 initial appointments, whilst the 
total number of appointments during the same year was above 198,700. Hence the 
average number of appointments per patient per year in the Centre was 4.5. This figure 
compares with the district average of 4 appointments per year. On the other hand, the 
                                                           
7
 The SIADAP – Sistema Integrado de Avaliação do Desempenho da Administração Pública is a system 
that evaluates the performance of the civil servants and other workers of Portuguese Public 
Administration (For further information, see Governo Português. (2003). Decreto-Lei 60/2003, de 10 de 
Maio., Assembleia da República Portuguesa. (2004). Lei nº 10/2004, de 22 de Março., Ministério das 
Finanças de Portugal. (2004a). Decreto Regulamentar nº 19-A/2004, de 14 de Maio., and Ministério das 
Finanças de Portugal. (2004b). Portaria nº 509-A/2004, de 14 de Maio.). 
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rate of active patients of the Centre was about 71%, which was above the district 
average of 65.9% (ARS Norte - SRS Porto, 2004; , 2005). 
 
Otley’s (1999) framework  
Objectives 
HC3 had several objectives. First, the interviewed Director stated that the key priority 
of the Centre was to satisfy patients. For achieving this goal it was necessary that staff 
worked effectively and contributed “with their share”, stated the Director. This priority 
was shared by the chief administrative officer, who went further to state that the only 
way of achieving the objectives was “through a team effort of doctors, nurses and 
administrative staff”. The other key objectives of the Centre were prevention, health 
promotion, health treatment, and health education and achieving this set of objectives 
was the major concern of the Chief Nurse. This interviewee stated that due to shortage 
of personnel it was not possible to give more attention to prevention. S/he added that 
healthcare in terms of prevention should be the principal objective, but in practice the 
priority was to treat patients. 
 
Strategies and plans 
It is unclear what strategies was HC3 meant to follow, since none of the interviewees 
had mentioned the existence of those strategies. This suggests that either HC3 devised 
its own strategies to achieve its key objectives. Differently, it seemed HC3 adopted two 
different tools to manage and monitor the performance of the Centre. First, the Centre 
used the Activity Plan and correspondent Activity Report. The Activity Plan had been 
produced with the contribution of all professionals having into consideration the 
guidelines received from HSR. The Plan included mainly health activities to do during 
the year. The Director added “We have to carry out the orientations from HSR, but no 
one stop us to do additional activities, projects…”. The GP interviewed added “We do 
a state diagnosis (internal and external) to know what the main areas to take action 
are”. The Chief Nurse explained that HSR prioritize risk groups, as diabetics, 
hypertensive and elderly. On the other hand, administrative staff interviewed stated that 
s/he was not aware of the Activity Plan details. “There is a plan, but you have to talk 
with the Director to know more about it”. This suggests that administrative activities 
were performed without any planning. 
 
Second, the Centre used information technologies to measure its performance. The 
interviewed GP stated that activities such as family planning, child health, were 
measured through the use of information systems. The tool used for this measurement 
was the SINUS software. This tool was available in all HCs. Some of the mentioned 
activities were measured monthly, others every six months, others even annually “in 
order to make the needed corrections to our future plan”, stated the GP. 
 
In sum, it seemed that HC3 had their own strategies, possibly based in some procedural 
controls from HSR. This Centre used the Activity Plan as an important management 
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tool in health services, especially when it was used in conjunction with the Activity 
Report, where planned activities were compared with the actuals. HC3 was not the only 
Centre that used the SINUS software, but the Centre’s interviewees mentioned this 




It was common for the targets defined by HSR being introduced in the HC3’s priorities, 
although these were adapted to the idiosyncrasies of the Centre (e.g. resources, number 
of patients, etc.). The interviewed GP stated it was very difficult to achieve the HSR 
targets since the Centre had several idiosyncrasies. This opinion was shared by the 
Director and the Chief Nurse. 
 
Rewards 
There was not a reward system at HC3, at least an “official” one defined by HSR. The 
Director mentioned that the rewards for achieving targets were internal, but did not 
specify them. From the HSR the Centre did not receive any rewards, “the maximum 
that could happen is [to receive] a call from HSR telling us that we achieved the targets, 
only that”, stated the Director. The same opinion was shared by the interviewed GP that 
explained: “Rewards? Nothing! The only existing reward is at a personal level”. The 
chief administrative officer, when asked to give examples of rewards, said “… personal 
satisfaction, which is good! Of course a monetary compensation would help, but self-
achievement is more important”. On a different note, the Chief Nurse stated that simple 
acknowledgements were sufficient, which meant that intrinsic motivation was more 
important than extrinsic motivation. 
 
According to the Director, the inexistence of an official reward system had negative 
consequences in terms of targets’ achievement. All interviewees admitted lack of 
penalties for those who did not achieve the targets. However, in medical meetings all 
staff members were reminded of the targets to achieve, and under-performers were 
mentioned in order to improve. No praise was given to over-performers. In the 
administrative area, the chief administrative officer admitted that good performance 
was not treated differently from bad performance. 
 
In sum, there was no evidence of the use of rewards in HC3. Consistent with this, no 
form of rewards was received from HSR. However, the discussion with interviewees 
provided some evidence that organisational participants experienced intrinsic rewards. 
All of this suggests that there is an unexplored potential for performance improvement 
from the use of performance rewards. 
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Information flows 
Several information flows were visible at HC3. First, there was some information that 
circulated orally in the Centre. For example, patients’ complaints were used as means 
of improving the procedures. The Director stated: “It is funny, but we learn much with 
our patients. They give us suggestions and we use them to improve”. Additionally, 
when some procedure was not adequately executed, someone called the attention of the 
staff member. This practice was more usual among administrative staff. Second, there 
was a ‘Procedures Manual’, which contributed to information circulation all over the 
institution. According to the Director, this document defined what the priority 
healthcare areas were. Third, the existence of management meetings promoted the 
performance improvement. In management meetings issues were discussed in order to 
improve the level of performance of the Centre at all levels of the organisation. The GP 
interviewed believed these meetings were one of the most important ways of 
information sharing, because the objectives were transmitted to all different staff areas: 
doctors, nurses, and administrative personnel. Staff groups meetings were a practice in 
which each staff group share particularities of their work. The GP stated: “Any 
situation, which was not as good as we wanted, is discussed and shared in order to be 
an example not to follow”. The Chief Nurse considered staff groups meetings very 
important for nurses as they discussed and shared some specific professional situations 
in order to improve. Staff groups meetings were also an usual procedure among 
administrative staff. Finally, information systems were used. The Doctor Help System 
(DHS) software, not generally used in HCs, helped doctors to monitor their 
performance and to share medical information about patients. The GP stated: “That 
[DHS software] gives another performance perspective, for example in terms of 
diagnosis and prescription”. The SINUS – Information System for Health Units 
(Sistema de Informação para Unidades de Saúde) software was an important tool to 
give information about the performance of the Centre. This software was a generally-
used software in HCs and could integrate the DHS software. Some HCs used 





Objectives. In HC3, as with HC1 and HC2, there seemed to be a conflict between stated 
objectives and what was done in practice. The Chief Nurse was the only interviewee in 
the Centre that defined prevention and health promotion as a key objective for the 
Centre, which can be considered uncommon if we consider the interviewees from the 
other Centres. The other HC3’s interviewees did not mention the fact probably because 
they knew it was very difficult to implement those activities. Some of the reasons for 
these difficulties were lack of personnel and of other material resources. 
 
In this Centre, all staff saw the patient as a customer that must be satisfied. It seemed to 
exist a NPM attitude before the patient, which is consistent with other Centre 
interviewees’ opinion. The most important objective for this Centre was to provide the 
best care to patients. The way this objective was to be accomplished was through ‘team 
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effort’, as stated by the chief administrative officer and by “all staff members giving 
their best”, as stated by the Director. 
 
Strategies and plans. In HC3, there seemed to be lack of strategic thinking, especially 
regarding the link with HSR. The parent institution appeared to have failed in this task. 
In order to achieve the set objectives, the Centre probably devised its own strategies. 
The Activity Plan and the Activity Report were used in this Centre among medical 
staff. On a different note, administrative staff was not familiar with these management 
tools. However, the Petty Cash Fund Management Tool was prepared monthly by 
someone from administrative staff. The use of the SINUS software as a performance 
measurement tool appeared to be the case in HC3, in contrast with current practice 
among HCs. The most used features were booking appointments, invoicing, and 
receipts. 
 
Targets. As targets defined by HSR were adapted by each HC, including HC3, the 
existence of Centre specific constraints would be difficult to rank HCs. However, these 
customized targets were important as they provided some motivation to enhance staff’s 
performance. 
 
Rewards. All staff members recognized there was no rewards/penalties system. 
Although there was no recognition in the form of rewards from HSR, the Director 
maintained there were some internal rewards, but was unwilling to specify them. This 
can be considered an exception to the existing “official” system. Additionally, all 
interviewees admitted there were no penalties for those who did not achieve the goals. 
However, according to the GP, doctors were called to the attention when something 
went wrong. The nurse and the chief administrative officer identified self-achievement 
as a sufficient reward for the good performance, but recognized that a reward system 
with monetary compensation could motivate personnel in a stronger way. In sum, there 
was intrinsic motivation, but not extrinsic motivation mechanisms at HC3. 
 
Information flows. This Centre had several different forms of information flows. As 
with other Centres, most of information circulated orally in HC3. Meetings were also a 
very important way for the information sharing. HC3 was the only Centre out of the 
three studied that used patients’ complaints as a source for information. It seemed that 
different ways of information flows in this Centre enable avoiding problems of lack of 
direction. 
 
Merchant’s (1998) framework 
Provision of direction 
The situation that existed in HC3 in a management level was similar to that existed in 
the other Centres. That is, each HC received its main orientations from HSR. Some 
management tools used by HSR to monitor HC’s direction through two main areas: 
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medical and administrative / financial. Medical area was controlled through the 
Activity Plan and TB. Administrative / financial area was controlled through TB, Petty 
Cash Fund Management, and Budget of the HSR. 
 
At the more operational level, HC3’s Director stated that all staff members were 
acquainted of the objectives of the Centre. These objectives were translated into a plan, 
based on the guidelines of HSR and produced with voluntary contributions from all 
interested staff. Meetings were also an important way of transmitting the main 
orientations and of sharing organizational and planning issues. Doctors, nurses, and 
administrative staff had regular meetings. The internal regulation document was also 
used to communicate the objectives of the Centre. 
 
Thus, all considered, the existing MCS at the management level seemed to be weak in 
providing direction. At the more operational level the MCS in place seemed to provide 
sufficient direction to all staff. 
 
Provision of motivation 
All interviewees of HC3 appeared to be very motivated to perform their roles. This was 
due to intrinsic motivation. The personal engagement with the profession was the main 
reason presented by the interviewees for their motivation. However, there were changes 
in the past, within the Centre, that caused some dissatisfaction among staff. Important 
functions were removed, such as team work in family planning. The Director was very 
frustrated, because after these events, HC3 had become a mere appointment centre. 
“This takes away our credibility”, added the Director.  
 
In spite of that event, doctors and nurses claimed to be motivated. The Chief Nurse 
stated: “They [nurses] are motivated; I give them reasons for being motivated. I give 
them training; I delegate them important functions”. This enthusiasm was not shared by 
all staff members of the Centre. In the opinion of the chief of administrative officer, 
some administrative staff was not motivated, as they complained very often. 
 
In sum, the existing MCS did not seem to provide enough motivation to staff, with the 
exception of nurses, who exhibited high level of intrinsic motivation. It seemed clear 
that no forms of extrinsic motivation were used, at least, the “official” ones. 
 
Provision of abilities 
HC3’s medical staff seemed to be adequately prepared to perform their work. The 
younger nurses had many good ideas to improve the Centre’s performance, as stated by 
the Chief Nurse. The Director and the GP considered continuous training as an 
important ‘insurance policy’ to ensure the efficiency of staff in their activities. In the 
opinion of the Director, GPs could be more efficient in their role if there was time to 
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share opinions with each other and to access to a library during working hours. “For me 
[i.e. in my view], the best training is during service”, stated the Director. The same 
opinion was shared by the interviewed GP. Both admitted the need of continuous 
training through regular meetings within the Centre or through medical conferences. 
 
In administrative area there was an exceptional case of a switchboard operator that 
performed the role of an administrative by processing the Petty Cash Fund support 
documentation. However this was not the rule among staff. The chief administrative 
officer recognised that among administrative personnel there was some staff 
insufficiently prepared to perform public assistance duties. “They do not have specific 
training for that”, stated this interviewee. 
 
Thus, the existing MCS did not offer a strong provision and development of abilities, 
particularly among administrative staff. Among medical staff, although the need for 
continuous training was sustained by the Director and the GP, this did not appear to 
seriously affect medical staff skills. 
 
Discussion  
In HC3 the discussion about overcoming control problems ought to have into 
consideration several types of controls (Merchant, 1998; Merchant and Van der Stede, 
2003). This procedure is similar to what happened with the other two studied Centres. 
 
The provision of direction and intrinsic motivation by the existing MCS seemed to be 
sufficient to all staff members of the Centre, since all were aware of the key objectives. 
However, there were some weaknesses in the links with HSR, resulting from lack of 
feedback. In the same vein, existing structures of MCS seemed do not provide nor 
extrinsic motivation neither development of abilities. 
 
Empowerment, especially among medical staff, could be helpful in increasing 
motivation. As there were no “official” rewards, empowerment can lead to a more 
decisive intrinsic motivation. Specific training could be the solution to overcome the 
lack of abilities problem, particularly among administrative staff. 
 
5. Conclusion 
Drawing on the new public management and management control systems literatures, 
this study examines how MCS are designed and used by three primary health care 
systems. It also investigates the nature of the relationship between the Health Centres 
and the management of HSR (the parent institution). In this study, Otley’s (1999) and 
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Merchant’s (1998) frameworks were used to describe, interpret, analyse and contrast 
the evidence collected from the three case studies.  
 
The interviews and archival data offer evidence that suggests low consistency and 
coherence in performance management practices in these institutions, which appeared 
to affect performance. Hierarchical controls seemed to be very weak and accountability 
limited, leading to a lack of direction, low motivation and, in some circumstances to 
insufficient managerial abilities and skills. The performance management systems 
appeared to have a number of weaknesses, suggesting that there are various 
opportunities for improvement in performance in the studied organisations. 
 
This study contributes to the public sector and management control systems literature 
in several forms. Firstly, it describes and provides insights as to how management 
control systems are used in the public sector health institutions, a sector with growing 
economic significance. Secondly, the study is one of the few field studies examining 
public Portuguese health care institutions. These institutions have been criticised over 
the years as being under-performers and over-spenders. The study sheds light into some 
of the potential factors explaining this chronic poor performance. Thirdly, the study 
integrates different frameworks into a single field study, providing a richer descriptions 
and more complete analyses of the evidence collected. It is also hoped that this research 
will lead to improvement in performance measurement and management practices and, 
ultimately, to improvements in the way health care organizations use their limited 
resources in the provision of services to the communities. 
 
While effort was placed in minimising the shortcomings of this research study, it 
nevertheless suffers from a number of limitations. Firstly, most data collected through 
interviews to individuals in various positions, who may have been led to pursue their 
personal agendas as opposed to providing true and fair descriptions of the facts. 
Secondly, time constraints meant that the study was limited in length. A longitudinal 
case study approach would have contributed to a more thorough understanding of 
practices and forces at play in the studied institutions. Thirdly, the study focused in one 
health sub-region and as such is not generalisable beyond the studied organisations. 
However, the insights of the study are likely to be a good starting point when 
examining similar organisations. We believe, however, that these limitations do not 
invalidate the findings and contributions of this study. 
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(minutes) Purpose Media used
Director PHCC1 17/02/2005 60 Interview Tape recorder
Doctor / GP PHCC1 17/02/2005 15 Interview Tape recorder
Nurse PHCC1 17/02/2005 24 Interview Tape recorder
Administrative PHCC1 17/02/2005 63 Interview Tape recorder
Average Professionals PHCC1 40.5
Patient 1 PHCC1 17/02/2005 3 Interview Tape recorder
Patient 2 PHCC1 17/02/2005 3 Interview Tape recorder
Patient 3 PHCC1 17/02/2005 6 Interview Tape recorder
Patient 4 PHCC1 17/02/2005 4 Interview Tape recorder
Patient 5 PHCC1 17/02/2005 3 Interview Tape recorder
Average Patients PHCC1 3.8
Director PHCC2 7/03/2005 24 Interview Tape recorder
Doctor / GP PHCC2 7/03/2005 53 Interview Tape recorder
Nurse PHCC2 7/03/2005 21 Interview Tape recorder
Administrative PHCC2 7/03/2005 26 Interview Tape recorder
Average Professionals PHCC2 31
Patient 1 PHCC2 7/03/2005 3 Interview Tape recorder
Patient 2 PHCC2 7/03/2005 12 Interview Tape recorder
Patient 3 PHCC2 7/03/2005 4 Interview Tape recorder
Patient 4 PHCC2 7/03/2005 4 Interview Tape recorder
Patient 5 PHCC2 7/03/2005 4 Interview Tape recorder
Average Patients PHCC2 5.4
Director and Doctor PHCC3 9/03/2005 70 Preparation meeting Researcher notes
Director PHCC3 11/05/2005 50 Interview Tape recorder
Doctor / GP PHCC3 11/05/2005 43 Interview Tape recorder
Nurse PHCC3 11/05/2005 43 Interview Tape recorder
Administrative PHCC3 17/05/2005 21 Interview Tape recorder
Average Professionals PHCC3 39.25
Patient 1 PHCC3 11/05/2005 7 Interview Tape recorder
Patient 2 PHCC3 11/05/2005 17 Interview Tape recorder
Patient 3 PHCC3 11/05/2005 3 Interview Tape recorder
Patient 4 PHCC3 17/05/2005 4 Interview Tape recorder
Patient 5 PHCC3 17/05/2005 3 Interview Tape recorder
Average Patients PHCC3 6.8
Chief of Financial Division HSR 22/03/2004 120 Interview Researcher notes
HSR 16/09/2004 120 Interview Researcher notes
HSR 20/01/2006 90 Interview Researcher notes
Average Chief of Financial Division HSR 110
Assessor of Coordinator HSR 23/09/2004 180 Interview Researcher notes
HSR 23/11/2004 30 Interview Researcher notes
HSR 7/12/2004 120 Interview Researcher notes
HSR 1/02/2005 60 Interview Researcher notes
Average Assessor of Coordinator HSR 97.5
Coordinator HSR 17/01/2005 30 Preparation meeting Researcher notes
Superior Technician (2 staff) HSR 24/04/2006 30 Phone interviews Researcher notes  
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